Scientific Explanation and Covering Law Model

Covering Law Model

Proposed by G.C. Hempel

According to the covering law model, explanation is derivation. When a scientist explains a phenomenon, he derives (deductively or inductively) a sentence describing that phenomenon (the explanandum sentence) from a set of sentences (the explanans) which must contain at least one general law.

( "Explanatory Unification", Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science, December 1981, 507-531 )
(Can be accessed from http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/tennant9/kitcher_PS1981.pdf)


Basically a statement is explained if it is derived from a set of laws together with certain factual statements, as we might explain 'Fido barks' by saying 'All dogs bark and Fido is a dog'.

The laws, however -though general (for example not mentioning particular objects) - need not be universal, and the derivation of the conclusion may be inductive and not deductive; explanations can be statistical or probabilistic as well as 'deductive-nomological'.

Problems concern the scope of the theory, what restrictions must be placed on the relevant general statements, and the relevance of background knowledge.

Source:
C G Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation (1965), ch. 12
(   http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies/covering-law-model.php  )


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Hempel  also suggests the unofficial view: "What scientific explanation, especially theoretical explanation,
aims at is not [an] intuitive and highly subjective kind of understanding, but an objective kind of insight that is achieved by a systematic unification, by exhibiting the phenomena as manifestations of common,
underlying structures and processes that conform to specific, testable, basic principles" (Hempel 1966, p. 83; see also Hempel 1965, pp. 345, 444).

Herbert Feigl makes a similar point: "The aim of scientific explanation throughout the ages has been unification, i.e., the comprehending of a maximum of facts and regularities in terms of a minimum of theoretical
concepts and assumptions" (Feigl 1970, p. 12).

Feigl, H. (1970), "The 'Orthodox' View of Theories: Remarks in Defense as well as Critique", in M. Radner and S. Winokur (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume IV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hempel, C. G. (1965), Aspects of Scientific Explanation. New York: The Free Press.
Hempel, C. G. (1962), "Deductive-Nonlogical vs. Statistical Explanation", in H. Feigl
and G. Maxwell (eds.) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 111.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Hempel, C. G. (1966), Philosophy of Natural Science. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

( "Explanatory Unification", Philip Kitcher, Philosophy of Science, December 1981, 507-531 )
(Can be accessed from http://people.cohums.ohio-state.edu/tennant9/kitcher_PS1981.pdf)

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Originally posted in
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